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through participation within the firm or, from another angle, how can participation 
within the firm contribute to atypical workers willingness to express innovative beha-
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nor hired for innovational purposes. For two reasons, the focus here is on the latter: 
we (1) presume and show, in contrast to what many scholars assume, that ordinary 
atypical workers can contribute to innovation in a direct and positive way, and (2) ar-
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Introduction 
For those who have faith in scholars’ premises and empirical evidence, it seems ob-
vious to believe that many modern organizations are torn in two ways: they have to be 
lean and unique simultaneously (e.g., Bolwijn & Kumpe, 1990; Michie & Sheehan, 
2003). Scholars refer to labor as a potential source of corporate obesity as well as ori-
ginality, suggesting that organizations balance these market demands by fragmenting 
the internal labor market (e.g., Atkinson, 1984; Hunter et al., 1993). 
To lose the costly drag of excess girth, numerous organizations shift entrepre-
neurial risks to assumed easy replaceable workers by eroding their ‘typical’ employ-
ment relationships. The consequent impact is that for these workers a secure ‘life-
long’ relationship with one organization, rooted in a permanent labor contract, is no 
longer routinely obvious (e.g., Beck, 1999; Boltanski & Ciapello, 1999). In this line of 
thought, for organizations their so-called atypical workers (e.g., self-employed, fixed-
term, and agency workers) are just another commodity that purely serves as a budget 
item subject to the exigencies of the all-important business cycle. In contrast, for uni-
queness or innovativeness, organizations place their trust on their core ‘human re-
sources’: highly educated employees with firm-specific capabilities and, consequently, 
a well-deserved permanent labor contract (e.g., Grant, 1991; Pavitt, 1991; Schuler & 
Jackson, 1987).  
Given these widespread thoughts, it is not surprising very few scholars’ link atyp-
ical workers in a direct and positive way to innovation; or that those who do so almost 
exclusively refer to highly educated ‘external knowledge workers’ explicitly hired for 
this aim. Nevertheless, Torka (2003) and Zhou et al. (2011) show that ‘ordinary atypi-
cal workers’, those neither highly educated nor hired for innovational purposes, can 
contribute to innovation in a direct and positive way. In this paper, we argue that 
workers’ direct and representative participation within the firm, a voice and (co-)decision mak-
ing capacity (Bryson, 2004), is essential for these workers contributions to innovation.  
Participation is an important predictor of innovation (e.g., Blume & Gerstlberger, 
2007; Schwarz-Kocher et al., 2011), but the way atypical work can add value is not yet 
integrated into this knowledge field. Or, from another angle, previous studies on atyp-
ical work and innovation neglect the effects of participation. Therefore, we here take 
up the challenge and provide a theoretical and conceptual framework for further re-
search that focuses on ordinary atypical workers direct and positive contributions to 
innovation through participation within the firm. 
This article is structured as follows. We first review the literature that ignores par-
ticipation, but explicitly claims to contribute to the atypical work and innovation dis-
cussion. This attention is crucial: after all, insight into the current state of research 
provides knowledge about (opposing) assumptions, (contradictory) findings, and 
shortcomings; all ingredients for future empirical investigations and theoretical explo-
rations to come. Next, we integrate participation within the firm into the atypical work 
and innovation link. We discuss the ways in which atypical workers direct and repre-
sentative participation can contribute to innovation, as well as present the conditions 
for their participation. The article closes with an integrative overview of the triptych 
atypical work, participation within the firm, and innovation.  
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Atypical workers and innovation 
Scholars refer to technical innovation as important for organizations’ competitive advan-
tage: the improvement or introduction of products/services or processes new to the 
firm or the market (e.g., Damanpour, 1991; Freeman & Perez, 1988). Improvements 
or simple adjustments refer to incremental innovations (also known as continuous 
improvement); fundamental changes that represent a break with or departure from ex-
isting practice refer to radical innovations (Dewar & Dutton, 1986). 
More recently, authors have begun to sketch the significance of social innovation: 
the introduction or improvement of organizational or human resource management 
policies and practices (e.g., Alasoini, 2009; Jones et al., 2010; Koski & Järvensivu, 
2010; Looise, 1996). Social innovation can affect technical innovation and vice versa, 
and both seem to positively influence firms’ economic performance. Moreover, the 
latter can influence (investments in) both forms of innovation (e.g., Frick, 2002; Ich-
niowski et al., 1996, Antonioli et al., 2009). 
 The literature on the link between atypical work and innovation discloses it 
yields either negative or positive outcomes for technical innovation. Within the posi-
tive and the negative cluster a difference can be drawn between direct and indirect 
contributions (see figure 1). Therefore, the following review is arranged along these 
two dimensions: direct vs. indirect and negative vs. positive.  
Atypical work has a direct, negative influence on innovation  
Several scholars refer to permanent employees’ positive emotional bond with their 
firm (i.e., affective organizational commitment) and their firm-specific capabilities be-
ing indispensable for innovation (e.g., Grant, 1991; Pavitt, 1991; Schuler & Jackson, 
1987). Thus, by implication, atypical workers miss the essential competences for inno-
vation and their employment status discourages the vital affection. Discouragement 
points to two suggested causes: the nature of the relationship and the quality of atypical 
work.  
Concerning the former, it has been assumed that atypical worker and organiza-
tion have an impersonal short-term monetizable exchange centered deal insufficient to 
evoke the stable, sincere feelings towards the organization assumed to be inevitable 
for innovation (e.g., De Ruyter et al., 2008; Michie & Sheehan, 2003). Quality refers to 
the atypical workers’ inferior conditions: besides job insecurity, they receive less pay, 
training, and appealing job conditions than do typical workers (e.g., Nienhüser & Ma-
tiaske, 2006). These features of the quality of work life influence commitment (e.g., 
Meyer et al., 2002), and the latter predicts innovation (e.g., Eisenberger et al., 1990).  
Following this line of reasoning, the relationship between atypical work and in-
novation is direct and negative. Several studies support such a negative assumption, but 
are inconclusive about a direct or indirect impact (e.g., Beugelsdijk, 2008; Chadwick & 
Capelli, 2002; Michie & Sheehan, 2003). Storey et al. (2002) report on a direct, nega-
tive influence: if those regarded as directly responsible for innovation were themselves 
atypical workers, the degree of innovativeness was lower. 
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Atypical work has an indirect, negative influence on innovation 
The literature also points to a possible indirect negative influence of atypical work on inno-
vation; namely, through undesired effects on the quality of typical workers work life, 
and consequently a declining state of mind and/or space to devote to invention. The 
presence of atypical workers might cause permanent employees to experience en-
hanced (perceptions of) job insecurity and super alienation as well distraction from 
core tasks (e.g., Boyce et al., 2007; Kulkarni & Ramamoorthy, 2005; Lee & Frenkel, 
2004). Referring to the latter, typical workers when confronted with large numbers of 
newly hired atypical workers report on massive investments in training and correcting 
mistakes. Expectedly, these typical workers complain about lacking time for core tasks 
(Torka, 2003) and therefore may miss an adequate work environment and muse for 
innovation.  
Atypical work has an indirect, positive influence on innovation 
The literature provides four basic arguments for indirect positive contributions of atypical 
work to innovation (e.g., Adams & Brock, 1986; Atkinson, 1984). First, atypical work 
as a source of cost savings creates opportunities for financial investments in innova-
tion. Altuzarra and Serrano (2010) found a positive relationship between the rate of 
temporary workers and investments in R&D activities. Second, atypical work is an op-
tion to remove the burden of routine work from core employees, in so doing freeing 
core human resources for innovation (Storey et al., 2002). Third, atypical work can 
serve as a buffer to protect the job security of permanent staff (see above). Finally, 
atypical workers’ presence might refresh those permanent employees’ set of attitudes 
and habits that hamper innovation such as conservatism, organizational blindness and 
rigidity. 
Atypical work has a direct, positive influence on innovation 
Finally, several authors ascribe to atypical work a direct positive role for innovation: firms 
consciously hire highly qualified atypical workers (i.e., external knowledge workers) to 
bring in fresh ideas and best practices taken from other firms, reducing obstacles for 
innovation as well as filling identified knowledge gaps (e.g., Lepak & Snell, 2002; Ma-
tusik & Hill, 1998).  There is considerable research supporting these assumptions (e.g., 
Arvantis, 2005; Gupta et al., 2009; Huang et al., 2009; Nesheim, 2003, Storey et al., 
2002). Figure 1 visualizes the four viewpoints presented above.   
Explaining contradictory assumptions and findings 
How are we to explain these contradicting assumptions and findings? There is a grow-
ing body of research by Martínez-Sánchez et al. (2011), Zhou et al. (2011) and Torka 
(2003) suggesting that restricting observation to employment status (i.e., atypical work 
vs. typical work) delivers mainly superficial knowledge, and may leads to incorrect 
conclusions.  Alternatively, it is argued that scholars need to gain insight about what is 
in the deal: what do organizations expect from (i.e., motives for using atypical work; 
e.g., Alewell & Hauff, 2011) and/or offer to atypical workers (i.e., work life quality) 
(see also Tsui et al., 1997; Tsui & Wu, 2005)?  
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Direct Indirect 
Positive
Negative 
Figure 1:  Arguments for atypical workers direct vs. indirect, positive vs. negative con-
tributions to innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Martínez-Sánchez et al. (2011) found that external knowledge workers contribute to 
innovation positively, whereas agency workers and short-term hires do so negatively. 
The author’s claim that “regarding the association between external flexibility and in-
novativeness, our research shows that it depends on the type of contingent employee” 
(p. 734); they link this assumption to organizations’ different motives for atypical 
work. Thus, previous contradictory premises and findings can be explained by scho-
lars’ disregard of organizations expectations about atypical work. From this point of 
view external knowledge workers contribute to innovation simply because organiza-
tions explicitly expect them to do so: innovation is a mandatory part of their deal. In 
contrast, for ordinary atypical workers innovation lies outside their mandate: they are 
hired strictly to fulfill other matter of fact aims such as meeting fluctuations, replacing 
absentees, and reducing labor costs. So, by implication, Martínez-Sánchez et al. (2011) 
assume that atypical workers behavior depends on and is entirely fixed by mundane 
organizational expectations.  
However, research suggests that ordinary atypical workers can exceed organiza-
tions’ expectations by directly and positively contributing to innovation. Thus, the 
conclusions drawn by Martínez-Sánchez et al. (2011) might be invalid because in prac-
tice organizations’ (prime) expectations do not appear to be all-decisive. Zhou et al. 
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(2011) found that organizations with high percentages of workers on fixed-term con-
tracts tend to have higher sales of imitative new products than organizations with low 
percentages of fixed-term workers, whereas the former perform significantly worse on 
sales of innovative new products than the latter.  Analysis shows that screening per-
sonnel by the technique of initially only offering temporary contracts relates positively 
to incremental innovation. The authors explain atypical workers positive effect on im-
itative innovation by referring to this practice: organizations offer more than a short-
term, instrumental deal; in so doing they seem to take into account workers interest 
for job security.   
It is essential to bear in mind that not all atypical workers want job security (e.g., 
Casey & Alach, 2004; Torka & Schyns, 2007). At least one study shows that ordinary 
atypical workers (i.e., metalworkers) without preferences for job security, and those 
with a preference for job security but without opportunities for permanent employ-
ment at the firm, can both directly and positively contribute to innovation: they share 
their renewing ideas with managers and colleagues or ‘just’ carry out improvements 
without the involvement of others (Torka, 2003). Communicating (on ideas) and de-
ciding (to carry out improvements) refer to participation within the firm (e.g., Bryson, 
2004; Marchington & Wilkinson, 2000; Ramsay, 1991).  
Innovation is just one feasible facet of participation. Consultation and (co-
)decision making can also concern, for example, department issues or workers’ inter-
ests. In the next section, we argue such general participation opportunities explain or-
dinary atypical workers’ direct and positive communications over and decision making 
on innovation. Thus, participation might explain contradictory assumptions and out-
comes concerning the normal everyday atypical work and innovation connection. 
However, previous studies on atypical work and innovation ignore these very basic 
potential effects of participation.   
Atypical workers and innovation: integrating participation within the firm 
Participation within the firm refers to direct participation (i.e., workers voice and (co-) 
decision making without the mediation of representatives; Bryson, 2004) and indirect or 
representative participation through works councils and alternative representation bodies not covered by 
law. Workers can participate through established mechanisms (e.g., works councils, al-
ternative representation bodies not covered by law, problem-solving groups), or by 
spontaneous face-to-face communications with managers and colleagues: alternatively, 
they may also raise voice and (co-)decide without any invitation or involvement from 
others (e.g., Koski & Järvensivu, 2010; Pyman et al., 2010; Salis & Williams, 2010). 
  Innovation studies often neglect the role of participation (e.g., Blume & 
Gerstlberger, 2007; Schwarz-Kocher et al., 2011), but some do show social and tech-
nical innovation benefit from direct and representative participation within the firm 
(e.g., Addison et al., 2007; Askildsen et al., 2006; Dilger, 2002; Jirjahn & Kraft, 2011; 
Schwarz-Kocher et al., 2011; Stracke & Nerdinger, 2010; Van het Kaar & Looise, 
1999). There seems to be a positive relationship between representative participation 
and direct participation (e.g., Helfen, 2005; Kleiner & Lee, 1997). For example, 
Müller-Jentsch (2001) found that firms with a works council show more direct partici-
pation activities than firms without one. Thus, representative participation can influ-
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ence innovation not only directly, but also indirectly via its effect on direct participa-
tion.  
In this section, we integrate participation into the atypical work and innovation 
connection. In so doing, we adapt general participation knowledge to atypical workers. 
We introduce the conditions or explanations for atypical workers participation by first 
discussing the several general paths by which atypical workers direct and representa-
tive participation can contribute to innovation. We also elaborate on recent relevant 
and significant knowledge gaps.   
Atypical work and innovation: participations contributions 
Participations direct contributions to innovation 
Participation can contribute to innovation in two direct ways. First, as participants in 
direct participation and/or as representative body members (i.e., representatives) 
workers might suggest inventions (i.e., voice), co-decide on innovations or ‘just’ carry 
out innovations without prior involvement from management (i.e., decide). Second, as 
representatives workers might act as ‘shaping companion’ (i.e., gestaltende Begleiter) 
by supporting management driven innovation.  For example, through mediation be-
tween management and staff, convincing staff of the change necessity, unlocking 
shop-floor knowledge important for innovation, and guarding worker interests during 
the innovation process (Schwarz-Kocher et al., 2011, p. 123).  
Ordinary atypical workers, those not highly educated and not hired for innova-
tional purposes, can directly communicate innovative ideas to managers or colleagues, 
or implement improvements without consultation in advance (Torka, 2003). It can be 
assumed that when these workers communicate and (co-)decide on innovation this 
exceeds organizations (prime) expectations. Moreover, given many scholars’ beliefs 
about what organizations (should) offer to such workers - a fair day’s pay for a fair 
day’s work -, some (e.g., Rousseau, 1995; Tsui & Wu, 2005) would go so far as to 
claim encouraging participation opportunities for ordinary atypical workers goes 
beyond organizations’ obligations (i.e., what they have to do for these workers).  
In contrast, highly educated external knowledge workers have to directly share 
ideas, raise voice and/or (co-)decide on innovation: participation on innovation is an 
integral, self-evident element of their function, of their deal. For them it is downright 
frivolous (a) to consider the participation topic ‘innovation’ as something extraordi-
nary or unexpected; (b) to investigate the conditions for participation (see next sec-
tion); and (c) to treat, in general, participation within the firm as an independent varia-
ble, an autonomous measure of additional value, for understanding the substance of 
atypical work and the innovation relationship. Consequently, we argue that participa-
tion within the firm is merely ‘the link’ between ordinary atypical workers and innova-
tion.  
So, besides the fact that ordinary atypical workers can communicate or (co-
)decide on innovation, what insights are there in the archives of social science, about 
direct and representative participations direct contributions to innovation in relation 
to these workers? A careful search reveals the dire truth -- almost none at all.  Re-
search on atypical workers direct contributions to innovation as representatives, their 
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possible role as ‘shaping companion’ and conditions for communicating about or 
executing innovations is entirely absent, as are investigations that penetrate the real 
contributions: what kind of improvements or introductions do these workers sug-
gest, (co-)decide on or carry out (‘concrete’ social or technical innovations)?  
Moreover, heretofore atypical work and participation within the firm have been 
essentially two disconnected research domains. Some scholars concentrate on the un-
ionization of atypical workers and unions’ efforts and strategies to recruit them (e.g., 
Aust & Holz, 2006; Francesconi & Garcia-Serrano, 2004; Pernicka & Aust, 2007). 
However, the vast and heavily walked over topic of union participation lies outside the 
chief concern of this article. After all, in many continental European countries (e.g., 
Germany, the Netherlands) unions interfere mainly on the industry or national level, 
and bargain on conditions of employment and especially pay and benefits. Decision 
making in regard to individual organizations policies and practices that seem to stimu-
late innovation such as direct participation, training-on-the-job, and internal mobility 
essentially do not enter into the union mandate. It is well understood that unions and 
union participation cannot directly influence firm’s innovation capacity (e.g., Looise et 
al., 2011). 
Participations indirect contributions to innovation 
Participation can contribute to innovation in three indirect ways. First, workers partic-
ipation can have an unintended consequence, leading to decisions and reconsidera-
tions on economic and organizational issues that ultimately contribute to innovation. 
For example, workers might recommend new workers who, once in the firm, seem to 
show innovative behavior; they may communicate about cheaper material where or-
ganizations that exploit this knowledge reduce costs and reinvest the savings in R&D 
activities; or as representatives they can initiate proposals for co-operation with other 
companies which once established can push innovation (e.g., Looise et al., 2011; Van 
het Kaar & Looise, 1999).   
Second, participation opportunities suggest that management considers workers as 
stakeholders (Beer et al., 1984).  This might lead to workers’ positive judgments about 
the ethics of management, about their sympathy for and sincere trust in them.  This 
would be reinforced by organizational agents who express commitment towards them. 
Workers perceive participation opportunities as a signal of ‘received’ commitment 
(Torka, 2011); it has been assumed the latter influences workers’ affective organiza-
tional commitment (Eisenberger et al., 1986). In this expansion of our understanding 
of the interactive factors at work, it becomes patent that the sheer presence of direct 
and representative participation opportunities can foster this commitment (e.g., Cox et 
al., 2006; Purcell & Georgiadis, 2006; Torka et al., 2010) and, consequently, stimulate 
innovational spirit (e.g., Eisenberger et al., 1990). Nevertheless, admittedly evidence 
based upon strong research about the relationship between participation, commit-
ment, and innovation is painfully not abundant.  
Third, when managers really listen, the quality of work life (e.g., job characteristics, 
safety, training opportunities) can be genuinely enhanced (Schwarz-Kocher et al., 
2011), which positively influences workers’ commitment (e.g., Meyer et al., 2002). 
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Consequently, through participation the work environment can improve in ways that 
will trigger invention as more generally the attitudes beneficial for innovation.  
This line of reasoning returns us to the ‘atypical work and innovation’ issue and 
the flock of scholars who have no doubt whatsoever that a positive emotional bond 
with the organization is indispensible for innovation.  There is a long list of those who 
are quite certain such a bond -- because of the relationship nature and the inferior 
quality of work – is impossible for atypical workers (e.g., De Ruyter et al., 2008; Grant, 
1991; Pavitt, 1991; Schuler & Jackson, 1987; Michie & Sheehan, 2003). There are three 
fundamental reasons such a proposition is not only flawed, but untenable. 
First, for ‘own’ and external knowledge workers’ innovation is a part of the deal 
with the organization: they ‘have to’ contribute to innovation, and this refers to in-
strumental commitment rather than positive emotions. Instrumental commitment 
might also help explain innovative behavior of some ordinary atypical workers: those 
who want job security may express such behavior for convincing managers they are 
‘permanent contract worthy’. Moreover, research suggests affective organizational 
commitment is not necessary for desired behavior: for example, Wallace (1997) found 
that motivation does not correlate significantly with the latter, but instead with affec-
tive occupational commitment.  
Second, organizations can and sometimes do offer the same participation oppor-
tunities (including representative participation), just one aspect of work life quality, to 
atypical workers and typical workers alike, and these opportunities seem to stimulate 
affective organizational commitment (Torka, 2003). Third, several studies clearly show 
the affective commitment of ordinary atypical workers can be similar to those of typi-
cal workers (e.g., McDonald & Makin, 2000; Pearce, 1993; Torka & Schyns, 2010). 
This pattern can be interpreted as evidence that their general work life quality, an im-
portant predictor of commitment, is equal.  
It is certainly wise to argue that among the multiple aspects of work life quality 
participation plays a central and special role, constituting a chief explanatory factor of 
these findings. When participation concerns worker issues, participation refers to 
workers (direct or representative) voice and (co-) decision making on matters they deal 
with directly. Only when managers take this voice seriously, i.e., grasp and accommo-
date workers’ interests, will desired outcomes (e.g., commitment, innovative behavior) 
be achieved (e.g. Bryson, 2004; Bryson et al., 2006; Gollan, 2003). This suggests that 
both ordinary typical and atypical workers, before participating on innovation or other 
issues that exceed their personal interests, must first be satisfied with participation re-
sults related to their work life quality.  
Torka’s (2003) findings support this idea. She found that managers initially have 
listened to those ordinary atypical workers who showed innovative behavior. For ex-
ample, when agency workers complained about their temp work agency salary, user 
firm managers negotiated with the agency.  Several agency workers asked for different 
work and managers approved their appeal; in several cases at the request of workers 
firms (voluntarily partly or fully) paid for agency workers training, even for those 
without the prospect of a permanent contract.  
230  Torka, Looise, Zagelmeyer: Ordinary Atypical Workers, Participation within the Firm and Innovation 
 
We are speaking about agency workers and other workers involved in a triangular 
employment relationship, a relationship between a worker, an employer and a user 
firm. Such workers can be involved in direct and representative participation in two 
organizations simultaneously, meaning through it they might directly contribute to in-
novation in two organizations. Research suggests both organizations are together re-
sponsible for ordinary atypical workers (non-)contributions to innovation: the work 
life quality offered by the employer can cause spill over effects for the user firm, and 
vice versa (e.g., Benson, 1998; Van Breugel et al., 2005). Thus, scholars’ studies of 
workers connected to two organizations in terms of participation and innovation 
should look closely at precisely what each organization offers.   
After this intensive description of the direct and indirect ways in which the partic-
ipation of ordinary atypical workers could contribute to innovation – ‘could’ because to 
date research is very scarce -, we must now turn to a fundamental factor: the condi-
tions for atypical workers participation.  
Conditions for atypical workers participation within the firm 
We contend that - in contrast to what many scholars think - ordinary atypical workers 
can directly and positively contribute to innovation, and that participation within the 
firm is the key to this behavior. We have delineated the ways in which their participa-
tion could contribute to innovation. To complete the picture one further knowledge 
gap needs to be filled: what are the conditions for ordinary atypical workers participa-
tion within the firm? We have to refer to general participation literature which sug-
gests three condition categories can be identified: (1) environmental conditions, (2) 
organizational conditions, and (3) individual conditions.  
Environmental conditions 
Environmental conditions refer to institutional frameworks and societal norms and values. Institu-
tional frameworks concern laws and regulations which tend to strongly determine rep-
resentative participation covered by law (e.g., Addison et al., 2000; Streeck, 2001). For 
example, Dutch and German law prescribes conditions under which employees have 
the right to establish a works council and council’s rights (e.g., Looise et al., 2011; 
Müller-Jentsch, 2008). It is widely understood that representative participation cov-
ered by law influences the paths to participation that are not covered by formal law 
(see section introduction). Therefore, it can be assumed that institutional frameworks 
indirectly influence the latter, via representative participation covered by law.  
In this context, agency workers need special attention. The Agency Worker Di-
rective of the European Parliament and of the Council (Directive 2008/104/EC) aims 
to introduce the ‘equal treatment’ principle for agency workers (and other atypical 
workers). However, despite the uniformity in the regulation differences between coun-
tries will remain. After all, the Directive’s ‘equal  treatment’ principle only covers basic 
working conditions such as pay and working time and is eerily silent on other aspects 
of work life quality such as job characteristics or participation. Thus, countries, agen-
cies and user firms continue to remain sovereign about the treatment of atypical 
workers.  
management revue, 22(3), 221-239 DOI 10.1688/1861-9908_mrev_2011_03_Torka  231 
 
In the Netherlands workers with a fixed-term contract can vote for and be 
elected members of the works council. Freelancers do not have any representative 
participation rights at the firm. However, the Dutch Law on Works Councils pre-
scribes that under certain conditions (i.e., tenure) agency workers can be elected 
members of the temp work agency and user firm works council. In other countries, 
agency workers cannot be elected members of representative participation bodies 
covered by law, or only have this right at the temp work agency (e.g., Germany, Pol-
and, Sweden). At the present time research about atypical workers in their role as rep-
resentatives (in bodies covered or uncovered by law) is entirely missing.   
For at least three basic reasons future (cross-national) research should take into 
account the institutional framework for atypical workers’ participation and real pres-
ence in representative bodies. First, representative participation rights may signal to 
organizations, that for atypical workers, participation in general is a normal, desired 
and valuable thing. This might contribute to a positive participation climate (e.g., 
Deery & Iverson, 2005; Pyman et al., 2010) for these workers and stimulates them to 
raise voice and (co-)decide on their work life quality. Consequently, if and when man-
agers start to listen, desired behavior is more likely. Thus, such formal participation 
rights may co-explain possible differences between countries concerning atypical 
workers work life quality, and consequently their attitudes and behaviors.  
Second, atypical workers who serve as representatives might also express more di-
rect voice and (co-) decision making behavior. Finally, atypical workers as representa-
tives may serve as ‘role models’: they (implicitly) ‘communicate’ to other atypical and 
typical workers as well as skeptical managers that the formers’ voice is desired. Such 
exemplarity can contribute to perceived feelings of ‘corporate democracy’ or non-
discrimination, a good participation climate, and related ‘productive’ outcomes. 
We also assume that societal norms and values that are not routinized into laws and 
regulations influence participation behavior. In general, the cultural dimension which 
encompasses an infinite range of human action, such as power distance and indivi-
dualism (Hofstede, 1980), might well explain a great deal about participation differ-
ences across countries. We suggest that atypical workers direct and representative par-
ticipation can be influenced by the regional societal appreciation and position of atypi-
cal work. For example, in Germany, in sharp contrast to the Netherlands, the media 
and actors commenting on events and trends commonly refer to agency work (i.e., 
Leiharbeit or Zeitarbeit) as a form of ‘modern slavery’. It is not impossible for such 
expressions to influence managers, typical workers and atypical workers perceptions 
of (the position of) atypical work in general, and consequently participation behavior. 
Thus, such societal convictions might co-explain why atypical workers in different 
countries may express varying attitudes, as well as in relation to typical workers. In 
sum, future studies on atypical work, participation, and innovation should take into 
account institutional frameworks and societal values when discussing results, especially 
when comparing atypical workers across countries.  
Organizational conditions 
Organizational conditions refer to three factors that can influence atypical workers direct and rep-
resentative participation: (1) management support for participation, (2) appropriate participation 
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policies and practices for participation and (3) work life quality. Not only innovation (e.g., 
Gemünden, 1985; Hauschildt & Chakrabarti. 1989), but also participation within the 
firm needs supporters or promoters. The responsiveness of top management and direct 
supervisors to participation is crucial (Bryson, 2004) because both can promote or op-
pose participation (e.g., Bryson et al., 2006; Ellguth, 2005; Hauser-Dietz et al., 2006; 
Pyman et al., 2010). Moreover, those who guide participation (e.g., direct supervisors, 
representatives) need to get unambiguous support from management (e.g., time for 
implementation, training) to fulfill this role adequately (e.g., Cunningham & Hyman, 
1999; Fenton-O’Creevy, 2001; Torka et al., 2008). 
Peirce et al. (1998) emphasize the importance of well-written participation policies 
and clear practices. These should take into account the subject matter (i.e., from trivial to 
strategic matters and concerns), degree (i.e., extent of influence), level (i.e., top-down in-
formation flow, consultation or decision-making) and form of participation (i.e., work-
er, department, establishment or corporate level) (e.g., Marchington & Wilkinson, 
2005, Ramsay, 1991). Moreover, to prevent dissatisfaction among workers about par-
ticipation, it has to be made clear if and when they should expect feedback on their 
contributions (Torka, 2003).  
Dissatisfaction and satisfaction with work life quality (e.g., pay, training opportuni-
ties, job characteristics) determine if workers raise voice and (co-)decide (e.g., Charl-
wood, 2002, Hirschman, 1970), and successful participation strongly influences work 
life quality. Thus, work life quality and participation reinforce each other. Again, we 
assume that managers must first to listen to workers interests and satisfy their needs, 
before the latter are willing to participate on issues that exceed their personal needs 
such as local department affairs and innovation.  
It can be assumed that management support and appropriate policies and practices for par-
ticipation determine not only the incidence of participation (e.g., presence or absence, 
amount), but also the perceived quality of participation. Participation quality refers to 
workers’ satisfaction with and perceived (distributive and procedural) fairness of par-
ticipation.  These notions seem to influence affective organizational commitment 
(Torka et al., 2010) and therefore behavior.  
All three organizational conditions influence typical and atypical workers direct 
and representative (non-)participation. Moreover, differences between typical and 
atypical workers concerning these conditions might explain differences in participation 
and related attitudes and behaviors. Therefore, future research on atypical work, par-
ticipation, and innovation should always take into account ‘the equality’ of organiza-
tional conditions. 
Individual conditions 
Finally, it is also the case that workers individual characteristics and personality seem to in-
fluence participation. Studies show that the following individual characteristics are re-
lated to direct and representative participation (i.e., membership in representative bo-
dies): age, gender, tenure, educational level, job level, participation experience, left-
wing views, instrumentality (i.e., participation for rational, calculated motives), and 
collective versus individualistic orientation (e.g., Behrens, 2009; Furåker & Berglund, 
2003; Hyman, 1992; Pernicka, 2006; Strömer, 2010).   
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 Up to now there have been very few studies that explore the relationships be-
tween personality (e.g., Big Five, self-efficacy, risk aversion, perceived locus of con-
trol) and participation, but there is slight archival evidence that personality predicts 
workers’ direct and representative participation (Avery, 2003; LePine & Van Dyne, 
2001; Nikolaou et al., 2008; Strömer, 2010). Thus, future research on atypical workers 
participation should include or at least control for individual parameters. This advice is 
reinforced by the fact that a number of studies show that atypical workers (like per-
manent employees) are not a homogenous group: In the real world of labor flowing 
across national and regional boundaries, they differ concerning their (contract) prefe-
rences, individual characteristics, education, skills and so on (e.g., De Cuyper et al., 
2008).  Translated to participation, this means that individual conditions might be 
equally or more important for explaining participation behavior than the employment 
status. 
After this description of conditions for atypical and typical workers’ direct and 
representative participation, and presenting knowledge on the relationships between 
the core variables central to this article, let’s proceed to summarize our (simplified) 
conceptual model that can guide future research on the triptych atypical work, partici-
pation within the firm and innovation:  
Figure 2:  Conceptual model explaining the connections between participation within 
the firm and innovation for (atypical and typical) ordinary workers 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this article was to provide a theoretical and conceptual framework that 
might be fruitful in further research about a current frontier of knowledge: ordinary 
atypical workers (i.e., not highly educated or hired for innovational purposes) direct 
and positive contributions to innovation through participation within the firm. We 
stressed the weak state of current research on atypical work and innovation, and of-
fered an outline of the direct and indirect ways in which atypical workers can contri-
bute to innovation, and the conditions for atypical workers direct and representative 
participation.  
Not only is research on the triptych missing, but many of the studies that there 
are on atypical work and innovation ignore, besides the effects of participation, organ-
izations expectations and offers to atypical workers.  It is a glaring fact that atypical 
workers are a neglected group in investigations on participation within the firm. How-
ever, we assume that we have made a persuasive case that participation within the firm 
is decisive for ordinary atypical workers’ unexpected and extraordinary contributions 
to innovation. Moreover, we were able to show that several widespread assumptions 
about (the position of) atypical workers are not per se true: organizations do not neces-
sarily treat ordinary atypical workers as a ‘second class commodity’ or fragment the in-
ternal labor market into inferior and superior labor segments.  They can and should 
offer these workers a work life quality equal to those of permanent employees so they 
can develop the same levels of satisfaction with work life, desired attitudes and beha-
viors.    
 Given the importance of participation within the firm for workers (e.g., work 
life quality, well-being) and organizations’ innovation capacity, further research zoom-
ing-in on atypical workers seems very appropriate. This research should anticipate on 
two obstacles researchers on participation and/or innovation have already mentioned.  
First, investigators should overcome a pure “dummy variable approach” (Addison 
et al., 2004; p. 227-278). This means the exclusive focus on the presence or absence 
and/or the amount of participation and innovation. Instead, researchers should also 
pay attention to the participation quality and content as well as the substance of the 
ordinary atypical workers concrete contributions’ to social and technical innovation: 
what kinds of improvements or introductions do these workers suggest, (co-)decide 
on or carry out? 
Second, many participation and innovation researchers seem to choose a one-sided 
view. They exclusively focus, for example, on either the firm-level, a management 
perspective or on workers’ perceptions. However, in order to achieve a deeper under-
standing, research on the triptych should pay attention to divergent evidence, beha-
viors, interests, perceptions, and roles related to different organizational actors (e.g., 
top-managers, line-managers, representation body members, subordinates) (e.g., 
Gemünden, 1985; Hauschildt & Chakrabarti. 1989; Koski & Järvensivu, 2010).  
Researchers engaged in participation and/or innovation issues are fully cognizant 
of these current problems and the incompleteness we have sketched in the core of this 
paper, and recommend overcoming them with case study research (e.g., Addison et 
al., 2004; Blume & Gerstlberger, 2007; Frick, 2008; Pyman et al., 2010). We urge such 
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projects begin with intense explorative, qualitative research. The use of (pilot-) inter-
views is an invaluable method since it is unclear whether the presented framework of 
participation predictors is exhaustive, and the number of actors within the cases is 
large enough for questionnaire research. Further, in general researchers should garner 
the wealth of common sense insight available to participants about the current ‘black 
box’ of the triptych employment relationships, worker participation within the firm, 
and innovation. Therefore, only after investigators have really listened to the voice of 
actors, about “what is really going on”, can questionnaire research be used to test the 
assumed relationships. 
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